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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5122
This paper examines the characteristics and performance 
of female-owned firms in Latin America. Data from 
firm surveys show that female-owned firms tend to be 
smaller than male-owned firms in terms of employees, 
sales, costs, and physical capital. Female-owned firms 
also have lower profits than male-owned firms, but for 
larger firms this difference disappears after controlling for 
labor and capital inputs. Medium-size and large female-
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to understand the role of gender-related issues in private sector development. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at   
mbruhn@worldbank.org.  
owned firms are as productive as male-owned firms of the 
same size, although micro and small female-owned firms 
are less productive than male-owned firms. There is no 
evidence that the differences between female and male-
owned firms are due to differences in access to finance or 
regulatory burdens. However, this paper finds a negative 
correlation between child care and household obligations 
and female-owned firm size and performance. 1 
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1. Introduction 
 A long-standing literature has examined female entrepreneurship, as well as differences across 
female and male-owned firms, in developed countries. (See Parker, 2009, for an overview of this 
literature.) More recently, there has also been an increased interest in female-run firms in 
developing countries and their potential for creating growth in these countries. Many 
microfinance programs focus on female borrowers, encouraging women to set up firms, and 
several government programs are also geared towards promoting female entrepreneurship. 
 
However, compared to the developed country evidence, there is little systematic evidence on the 
characteristics and performance of female-owned firms in developing countries
2. Moreover, 
obstacles faced by female business owners in developing countries could differ from obstacles in 
developed countries and could also differ across countries or regions within the developing 
world, depending on the institutional, cultural, and religious background of the region. For this 
reason, it is important to study the characteristics, performance, and obstacles of female-owned 
firms separately for different regions. 
 
This paper examines female entrepreneurship in Latin America. It first uses nationally 
representative labor market surveys to characterize how female firm ownership in Latin America 
varies across firm size and industry in eight Latin American countries. In all countries, female 
firm owners are concentrated in the smallest firms, as measured by employees, reaching up to 50 
percent of micro firm owners. The percentage of female firm owners is much smaller among 
larger firms, going down to 12 percent. With respect to industries, the percentage of female firm 
owners is highest in trade, followed by manufacturing and services. 
 
The paper then relies on firm level surveys from a number of Latin American countries to 
investigate differences in characteristics and performance across female-and male-owned firms. 
These firm surveys cover a range of different firms, from micro firms to large manufacturing 
firms. All surveys show that female-owned firms are not only smaller in terms of their number of 
employees, as was evident in the labor market surveys, but also in terms of sales, costs, and the 
value of physical capital. The magnitude of the difference in employees ranges from 9 to 36 
percent, and the magnitude of the difference in sales ranges from 23 to 104 percent. Female-
owned firms also have lower average and median profits than male-owned firms. Average profits 
are between 15 and 20 percent of a standard deviation lower for female-owned firms than for 
male-owned firms. Finally, female firm owners tend to have fewer years of education than male 
firm owners, and they work about 25 percent fewer hours than male firm owners. 
 
                                                            
2 Exceptions include Bardasi and Getahun (2008), De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009), and World Bank 
(2008). 3 
 
The paper then asks whether female-owned firms are less productive than male-owned firms. 
The productivity analysis shows that this is true for micro and small firms. However, there is no 
difference in productivity between medium-sized and large female- and male-owned firms. 
 
The paper considers a number of different obstacles that could be the reason why female-owned 
firms are smaller than male-owned firms. Most of these obstacles do, however, not appear to 
differ across female- and male-owned firms. First, I do not find any consistent evidence that 
female-owned firms have less access to external finance than male-owned firms. Second, female 
firm owners are no more likely to perceive a host of institutional and market related factors to be 
obstacles to firm operation and growth than male-owned firms. The only significant difference in 
perceived obstacles is that female firm owners are up to 50 percent more likely than male firms 
owners to report that having to care for children and household obligations poses an obstacle to 
firm operation and growth. 
 
Additional analysis using matched household-firm data for Mexican micro firms also suggests 
that child care obligations could be restricting the growth of female-owned firms. The results of 
this analysis show that the differences in size and profits between female- and male- owned firms 
are larger in households where children under the age of 12 are present. The presence of children 
accounts for 30 to 40 percent of the differences in size and profits between female- and male-
owned firms. Data from Mexico and Bolivia also indicate that women are two to three times 
more likely than men to operate a business from inside their home. This suggests that household 
obligations could be restricting the location, size and industry choices of female entrepreneurs
3. 
 
Finally, the paper examines differences in risk aversion as another factor that could explain why 
female-owned firms tend to be smaller than male owned firms. Data from Mexico, however, do 
not show any differences in the level of risk aversion of female and male entrepreneurs. 
 
This paper is related to Sabarwal and Terrell (2009) who study the performance of female-owned 
firms in Latin America. They also find that female-owned firms are smaller than male-owned 
firms in many dimensions. However, their paper differs from this paper in the sense that they 
only use data on formal firms with over 5 employees. Moreover, the data they use does not 
clearly distinguish between female-owned firms and family-owned firms, since the data only 
indicates whether one of the principal owners if female. The results are thus not directly 
comparable to the results of this paper. In addition, the data used in Sabarwal and Terrell does 
not allow them to examine child care and household obligations as an obstacle to firm 
                                                            
3 Note that this evidence does not necessarily imply that female firms would grow if women’s child care and 
household obligations were reduced. The correlations observed in this paper are equilibrium outcomes, which could 
reflect an efficient division of labor in the household instead of reflecting an obstacle to female-owned firm growth. 
Investigating whether female-owned firms would grow if women’s child care and household obligations were 
reduced requires examining the effect of an exogenous change in child care and/or household obligations on female 
firm growth, such as the introduction of a child care program. The findings in this paper suggest that this is an 
important area for future research. 4 
 
performance and growth, whereas my findings point to these obligations being an important 
obstacle for the development of female-owned firms in Latin America. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the distribution of female 
business ownership across firm size and industries. Section 3 describes differences in 
characteristics and performance of female- and male-owned firms. Section 4 investigates 
possible reasons for the differences across female- and male-owned firms. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Female Businesses Ownership by Firm Size and Industry 
This section examines how female business ownership varies across firm size, industry, and 
countries within Latin America. The statistics in this section are based on national household 
surveys that, in most cases, are representative for the whole country. For Brazil and Peru, these 
surveys are only representative for the largest cities. 
I chose to use household surveys rather than firm surveys in this section since most surveys that 
cover a large number of firms in different industries and across different firm sizes do not 
include information on firm owner’s gender. Based on the household surveys, I construct a 
sample of individuals that when asked about their economic activity say that they are either self-
employed or business owners. If they are business owners, the surveys also ask them how many 
employees the firm has. For all individuals, the industry in which they work is also available. 
Figure 1 displays the percentage of micro, small, and medium-size firm-owners that are women, 
averaged over all industries. Micro firms are defined as having less than five employees 
(including the owner). This category thus also includes the self-employed. The percentage of 
female business owners in micro firms ranges from 33 percent in Argentina to 50 percent in 
Honduras. As firm size increases, the percentage of female business owners drops in all 
countries. Only between 18 and 31 percent of small firms owners are women, where small firms 
are defined as having 5 to 10 employees. 
A drawback of using national household surveys is that they capture few large firm owners. The 
largest category (medium size firms) is thus defined as firms that have more than 11 employees. 
For Bolivia and Peru, there are only a handful of firms in this category, leading to imprecise 
estimates of the percentage of female ownership. Other than for these two countries, the data 
show consistently that female ownership declines as the firm size category increases. Medium 
size firms have the lowest percentage of female owners, going down to 12 percent in Mexico. 
  5 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Female Firm Owners by Size Group 
 
Note: Micro firms are defined as having less than 5 employees (including the owner), small firms have 5 to 10 
employees, and medium size firms have more than 11 employees. For Uruguay only, small firms have between 5 
and 9 employees and medium size firms have more than 10 employees. The year is 2008 or a year close to 2008. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on household surveys from local statistical agencies. 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of female firm owners in different industries. In all countries, the 
highest concentration of female firm owners is in trade. Up to 48 percent of firm owners in this 
industry are women. Manufacturing is the industry with the second largest percentage of female 
firm owners, followed closely by services. In most countries, few firm owners in agriculture are 
women, with the exception of Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador. In all countries, there is only a 
negligible fraction of female firm owners in the construction industry. 
Overall, the household survey data indicates that there is substantial variation in the percentage 
of female firm owners across firm size categories and across industries. Female firm owners are 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Female Firm Owners by Industry
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on household surveys from local statistical agencies. 
 
 
3. Characteristics and Performance of Female-Owned Firms vs. Male-Owned Firms 
3.a. Data Description 
 
This section relies on four different firm level data sets from a number of Latin American 
countries data to compare characteristics and performance of female-owned and male-owned 
firms. The first dataset is a 2002 nationally representative micro firm survey from Mexico, the 
Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN). The second and third datasets are World Bank 
surveys of micro and small firms in Bolivia and Peru, from the year 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
These surveys cover only a small number of industries and are not designed to be representative 
of these industries. The fourth dataset encompasses the 2003 World Bank Enterprise Surveys for 
Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Unlike the other three 
datasets, the Enterprise Surveys focus on larger firms and include only few firms with less than 5 
employees. The Enterprise Surveys cover only the manufacturing industry and are nationally 
representative for manufacturing firms. Firms in the Enterprise Survey are all formal, whereas 
the three micro firm surveys interview formal and informal firms. 
 
All these datasets were chosen because they allow me to identify whether the principal owner of 
the firm is male or female. The three micro firm surveys interview the owner and also include 
several owner characteristics, such as education and family background. The Enterprise Surveys 
do not necessarily interview the firm owner, but they include a question about the gender of the 
firm’s principal owner
4. They do not provide other owner characteristics. All surveys also 
provide information on the firm performance, financing, as well as obstacles the firm faces. 
                                                            
4 Another round of World Bank Enterprise Surveys was conducted in a large set of Latin American countries in 
2006. However, the 2006 surveys do not ask for the gender of the principal owner. Instead, they ask whether any of 


































Argentina  Bolivia Brazil  Ecuador Honduras Mexico Peru
Agriculture Manufacturing Construction Trade Services7 
 
 
The reason for using multiple, complementary datasets is that it allows me to investigate whether 
the differences across female and male-owned firms vary across countries and firm types. 
Moreover, as will become clear in the discussion below, each dataset has its own strengths and 
weaknesses in terms of sample size, coverage, and questions that could be relevant to identifying 
obstacles for female entrepreneurs. 
 
Each of the datasets covers a different set of industries. The Enterprise Surveys cover only 
manufacturing firms. The Mexican data covers all industries, but the Bolivian and Peruvian data 
only cover activities that are commonly performed by micro or small firms in each respective 
country. Appendix Table A1 contains a list of industries represented in each dataset, with the 
corresponding share of female-owned firms. In line with the statistics in Section 2, in the 
nationally representative Mexican data, the largest share of female firms is in the trade sector 
(45.3 percent), followed by manufacturing and services. The Enterprise Survey data, which is 
representative of large, formal firms in the manufacturing industry, indicates that there is quite a 
lot of variation in female-ownership within the manufacturing industry. The highest 
concentration of female-owned firms (32.2 percent) is in clothing manufacture, while there are 
few female-owned firms in textile manufacture (5.4 percent). 
 
Table 1 compares averages and standard deviations for the variables used in this section across 
the different datasets. With 1.37 employees on average, firms in the Mexican data are smaller 
than the firms in the other datasets. Second largest are the firms in the Bolivian data, with 3.89 
employees on average, followed by the firms in the Peruvian data, with 6.97 employees on 
average. With 85 employees on average, firms in the Enterprise Surveys stand out as being much 
larger than the firms in the other datasets. When looking at sales or profits as a measure of firm 
size, the Mexican data again includes the smallest firms, followed by the Bolivian data, the 
Peruvian data, and then the Enterprise Surveys. 
 
About 30 percent of firms are female-owned in the Mexican and Peruvian data. In the Bolivian 
data, this number is higher (46 percent); while in the Enterprise Surveys, the number is much 
lower (15 percent). Appendix Figure A1 shows that, in the Mexican, Bolivian, and Peruvian 
datasets, the distribution of female-owned firms across firm size as measured by the number of 
employees is very similar to the one displayed in Figure 1 in Section 2. The percentage of 
female-owned firms reaches up to 55 percent in the smallest size category, but tends to decline 
with firm size. Note, however, that the datasets for Bolivia and Peru are not representative and 
that Table A1 can thus only be used to describe the sample, but not to draw conclusions about 
the percentage of female firms in these countries overall. Appendix Figure A1 also indicates that, 
among the relatively large manufacturing firms in the Enterprise Surveys, the percentage of 
female-owned firms again drops with firm size. Firms in the largest size category (over 100 
employees) have very low shares of female ownership, varying from 4 percent in Ecuador and to 
14 percent in El Salvador.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
family firms from other firms in the data. The percentage of female owned firms as measured in the 2006 Enterprise 
Surveys is about twice as big as measured in the 2003 Enterprise Surveys, suggesting that any gender based statistics 
and differences generated from 2006 surveys might be confounded with characteristics of family owned firms. 
Sabarwal and Terrell (2009) use the 2006 Enterprise Surveys to examine differences in firm characteristics and firm 
performance across firms with partial female ownership and firms without any female ownership. 8 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
   Averages and Standard Deviations 
 
Mexico Bolivia  Peru  Enterprise 
Surveys 
Panel A: Firm characteristics       
Firm age  9.57  13.55  12.96  19.32 
  (9.15) (10.67)  (10.02) (15.58) 
Employees 1.37  3.89  6.97  85.59 
  (0.90) (5.43) (6.21)  (239.75) 
Property value (in thousands)  8.89  9.54    418.25 
  (16.98) (52.45)    (2393.17) 
Machinery value  (in thousands)  3.12  4.97    456.34 
  (7.67) (14.12)    (2590.59) 
Sales (last month)  1.15  1.36  6.66  1944.25 
  (2.30) (2.94)  (14.71)  (5047.84) 
Operating costs (last month)    0.88  5.27  1533.88 
   (2.33)  (10.91)  (4123.64) 
Profits (last month, in thousands)  0.38  0.47  1.40  410.36 
  (0.41) (0.97) (6.64)  (1293.68) 
Firm is registered with the authorities  0.31  0.55  0.65   
  (0.46) (0.50) (0.48)   
Adopted new technology during past 3 years       0.60 
      (0.49) 
Panel B: Owner characteristics       
Female  0.29 0.46 0.29  0.15 
  (0.45) (0.50) (0.45)  (0.35) 
Hours worked  45.13  59.78  59.02   
  (23.11) (29.65) (23.51)   
Owner's years of schooling  8.06  10.55  11.94   
  (4.93) (4.54) (3.51)   
Owner participated in business training    0.25     
   (0.43)    
Owner's mother has no schooling    0.35     
   (0.48)    
Number of firms  8,293   265   582   2,175  
Note: Property and machinery values in the Mexican and Bolivian data are conditional on having property or 
machinery, respectively. All monetary values are in US Dollars. 
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN), 2002, Bolivian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 
2007, Peruvian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 2008, World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Brazil, Ecuador, 




3.b. Gender Differences in Firm Characteristics 
 
This section examines whether female-owned firms are different from male-owned firms in 
terms of size, profitability and other business and owner characteristics. Table 2 displays the 
differences in the average characteristics across female- and male-owned firms, along with their 
statistical significance. All differences control for city, region, or country fixed effects, in order 
to eliminate any possible confounding factors associated with the fact that some areas have a 
larger share of female entrepreneurs. Most of the outcome variables are in logs in order to ensure 
that the results are not being driven by outliers. 
 
Table 2 shows that female-owned firms tend to be younger than male-owned firms, although this 
difference is only statistically significant in the Mexican and Peruvian data. In line with the 
results on firm size from Section 2, female-owned firms have fewer employees than male-owned 
firms. In the Mexican data, where most firms only have a handful of employees, the difference in 
employees is 9.4 percent. In the Bolivian data and in the Enterprise Surveys, female-owned firms 
have about 30 percent fewer employees than male-owned firms. There is no statistically 
significant difference in employees across female-owned and male-owned firms in the Peruvian 
data. However, female-owned firms in the Peruvian data are smaller than male-owned firms in 
terms of sales and operating costs. In the other datasets, female-owned firms also have lower 
sales and lower operating cost than male-owned firms. Depending on the dataset, the magnitude 
of the difference in sales varies from 22.6 to 103.7 percent
5. All datasets except for the Peruvian 
data include information on property and machinery owned by the firms. Both property and 




The profit data displayed in Table 2 indicates that female-owned firms also have lower profits 
than male-owned firms in all datasets. Note that profits are not measured in logs here since this 
variable includes negative values
7. The magnitude of the difference in average profits ranges 
from 15 to 20 percent of a standard deviation. The difference is statistically significant in all 
countries except Bolivia, possibly due to the small sample size of the Bolivian data. Since the 
profit variable has a lot of variation in it, I also ran a median regression for profits to check the 
robustness of the results to outliers, thus comparing median profits rather than average profits. 
The difference in median profits is also negative and is statistically significant for all datasets 
except the Peruvian data.    
                                                            
5 The differences in firm size across female- and male-owned firms are robust to controlling for firm age, suggesting 
that they do not simply reflect differences in the firms’ vintage. 
6 In the Mexican data, only 15 percent of firms own property, and 87 percent of firms own machinery or tools. In the 
Bolivian data, these numbers are 44 percent and 98 percent, respectively. All firms in the Enterprise Surveys own 
property and machinery. The property and machinery values are conditional on owning property or machinery, 
respectively. 
7 In order to ensure that results are not driven by extreme outliers, the sample excludes the firms that have profit 
values in the top and bottom 1 percentile for the firm’s region, industry, and size. 10 
 
Table 2: Differences in Characteristics of Female- and Male-Owned Firms 
   Difference in Averages (Female - Male) 
 
Mexico Bolivia  Peru  Enterprise 
Surveys 
Panel A: Firm characteristics       
Ln firm age  -0.538***  0.017  -0.227***  -0.025 
  (0.031) (0.098) (0.074)  (0.054) 
Ln employees  -0.094***  -0.361*** -0.029  -0.319*** 
  (0.009) (0.105) (0.076)  (0.063) 
Ln property value  -0.609***  -0.794**    -0.545*** 
  (0.075) (0.311)    (0.124) 
Ln machinery value  -1.213***  -2.273***    -0.748*** 
  (0.055) (0.229)    (0.122) 
Ln sales (last month)  -0.226***  -1.037***  -0.260**  -0.597*** 
  (0.032) (0.170) (0.128)  (0.097) 
Ln operating costs (last month)    -1.270*** -0.247*  -0.613*** 
    (0.189) (0.143)  (0.097) 
Profits (last month, in thousands)  -0.061***  -0.191  -1.035**  -191.47*** 
  (0.009) (0.120) (0.514)  (67.15) 
Profits (last month, in thousands)  -0.062***  -0.160***  -0.109  -13.34*** 
 - median regression  (0.000) (0.035) (0.083)  (5.65) 
Firm is registered with the authorities  -0.067***  -0.174***  -0.008   
  (0.011) (0.061) (0.043)   
Adopted new technology during past 3 years      -0.058** 
      (0.030) 
       
Panel B: Owner characteristics       
Ln hours worked  -0.265***  -0.227***  -0.037   
  (0.020) (0.086) (0.052)   
Owner's years of schooling  -0.740***  -1.806***  -0.323   
  (0.119) (0.548) (0.334)   
Owner participated in business training    -0.141***    
    (0.051)    
Owner's mother has no schooling    0.087    
    (0.060)    
Number of firms  8,293   265   582   2,175  
Note: Property and machinery values in the Mexican and Bolivian data are conditional on having property or 
machinery, respectively. All monetary values are in US Dollars. All regressions include city, region, or country 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN), 2002, Bolivian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 
2007, Peruvian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 2008, World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Brazil, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 2003. 
 11 
 
With respect to other firm characteristics, the Enterprise Surveys include information on whether 
a firm adopted a new technology during the past three years. Female-owned firms are 5.8 percent 
less likely to have adopted a new technology. As mentioned above, the Enterprise Surveys do not 
contain any owner characteristics other than gender. The other surveys, however, provide the 
owner’s number of hours worked during the past week and also the owner’s year of schooling. 
Both are statistically significantly smaller for female owners than male owners in Mexico and 
Bolivia. Women work about 25 percent fewer hours than men and have 0.75 fewer years of 
schooling than men in Mexico and 1.8 fewer years of schooling in Bolivia. The differences in 
hours worked and schooling are smaller in Peru and are not statistically significant, although 
they are still negative. The Bolivian data also provides information on whether the firm owner 
has ever participated in any business training. Women are 14 percent less likely to have done so 
than men. Another variable collected in the Bolivian data is whether the business owner’s mother 
has any formal education. This variable is a proxy for family background and could shed light on 
whether female business owners are from more or less disadvantaged families than men. There 
is, however, no statistically significant difference in mother’s formal education status across 
female and male business owners. 
 
Overall, the data indicate that female-owned firms are smaller than male-owned firms along all 
dimensions and that they are less profitable than male-owned firms. Table 3a investigates 
whether female firms are also less productive than male-owned firms. The table displays the 
regression results of an OLS regression of sales on the female owner dummy, controlling for the 
inputs into the production process. The regressions are based on a Cobb-Douglas production 
function of the form Y = (AL)
1-α-βH
αK
β. Here, L stands for the labor input and is measured by the 
number of employees and hours worked by the owner. H stands for human capital and is 
approximated by the owner’s years of schooling. K stands for capital. The regressions control for 
three different types of capital separately, property, machinery, and material inputs. Note that not 
all firms in the Bolivian, Mexican, and Peruvian data have property, machinery, or material 
inputs. I address this in the regressions by replacing the log values of these variables with zero 
when their non-log value is zero and then adding a dummy for whether the non-log value is zero. 
A measure of technology, A, is only available in the Enterprise Surveys, which ask the 
respondents whether the firm adopted a new technology during the past three years. All 
regressions in Table 3a control for industry fixed effects since the production function is likely to 
vary across industries. 
 
In the Mexican data, female- and male-owned firms are, on average, statistically significantly 
less productive than male-owned firms. The size of the difference is on the order of 9 percent.  In 
the Bolivian data and the Enterprise Surveys, this difference is much smaller (1 to 2 percent) and 
it is not statistically significant. The Peruvian data displays the largest difference in productivity 
across female-owned and male-owned firms, 15.5 percent. Note, however, that the Peruvian data 
do not include information on property and machinery values. Machinery value is positively 12 
 
correlated with sales in the other dataset, implying that excluding it from the regression could 
bias the difference in productivity between female-owned and male-owned firms upwards. 
 
Table 3a: OLS Productivity Regressions 
   Dependent variable: Log sales 
 
Mexico Bolivia Peru Enterprise 
Surveys 
Female dummy  -0.089***  -0.013  -0.155**  -0.022 
  (0.034) (0.152)  (0.073) (0.032) 
Ln employees  0.170***  0.502***  0.657***  0.383*** 
  (0.038) (0.072)  (0.068) (0.021) 
Ln property value  0.017  0.076    0.042*** 
  (0.014) (0.047)    (0.009) 
Ln machinery value  0.032***  0.138***    0.076*** 
  (0.008) (0.040)    (0.010) 
Ln material costs  0.120***  0.452***  0.443***  0.574*** 
  (0.012) (0.052)  (0.037) (0.016) 
Adopted new technology during past 3 
years       -0.005 
       (0.024) 
Ln hours worked  0.029  0.003  0.038   
  (0.019) (0.100)  (0.063)   
Owner's years of schooling  0.009***  0.021*  0.015   
  (0.003) (0.012)  (0.010)   
R-squared 0.086  0.757  0.695  0.947 
Number of firms  8,293   265   582   2,175  
Note: These regressions are based on a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form Y = (AL)
1-α-βH
αK
β, where A 
stands for technology, L stands for labor, H for human capital, and K for physical capital. Ln property, ln machinery 
and ln material cost are replaced with zero when their non-log values are zero and the regressions include dummies 
indicating whether the non-log values are zero. All monetary values are in US Dollars. All regressions include 
industry fixed effects, as well as city, region, or country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN), 2002, Bolivian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 
2007, Peruvian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 2008, World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Brazil, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 2003. 
 
Table 3b displays the differences in productivity across female-owned and male-owned firms 
obtained by running quantile regressions instead of OLS regressions. The results show that the 
differences in productivity are largest for firms that are at the 25
th percentile of sales and smallest 
for firms that are at the 75
th percentile of sales. At the 25
th percentile of sales, female-owned 
firms are between 6.4 percent and 20.3 percent less productive than male-owned firms
8.  At the 
median, the differences in productivity range only from 1.8 percent to 16.9 percent. At the 75
th 
percentile of sales, the differences in productivity turn positive in the Enterprise Surveys and the 
                                                            
8 Although the difference of 20.3 percent that comes from the Bolivian data is not statistically 
significant, possibly due to the small sample size. 13 
 
Bolivian data, but they at are not statistically significant. In the Mexican data, female-owned 
firms at the 75
th percentile of sales are 7.3 percent less productive than male-owned firms. The 
regressions for the Peruvian data are the only ones that show a large difference in productivity 
for firms at the 75
th percentile of sales. However, the results for this dataset are likely to be 
biased due to the lack of information on machinery values. 
 
Table 3b: Quantile Productivity Regressions 
  
Mexico Bolivia  Peru  Enterprise 
Surveys 
25
th percentile  -0.131***  -0.203  -0.119*  -0.064*** 
  (0.046) (0.197)  (0.065)  (0.023) 
        
50
th percentile  -0.087**  -0.169  -0.105  -0.018 
  (0.035) (0.212)  (0.064)  (0.032) 
        
75
th percentile  -0.073*  0.185  -0.204***  0.020 
  (0.044) (0.151)  (0.071)  (0.043) 
        
Number of firms  8,293   265   582   2,175  
Note: The table displays the coefficients on the female dummy in separate productivity regressions that are based on 
a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form Y = (AL)
1-α-βH
αK
β, where A stands for technology, L stands for 
labor, H for human capital, and K for physical capital. The outcome variable is ln sales. Control variables and the 
respective notes are the same as for Table 3a. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1 
percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN), 2002, Bolivian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 
2007, Peruvian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 2008, World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Brazil, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 2003. 
 
Taken together, the results in Table 3a and Table 3b suggest that only micro and small female-
owned firms are less productive than male-owned firms. This is true for the firms in the Mexican 
data, which are predominantly micro firms and for the firms at the 25
th percentile of sales in the 
Bolivian data and the Enterprise Surveys, as well as for firms at the 50
th percentile of sales in the 
Bolivian data. The larger female-owned firms (in terms of sales) in the Bolivian data and in the 
Enterprise Surveys are equally productive as male-owned firms.  
 
 
4. Possible Reasons for Differences across Female- and Male-Owned Firms 
 
This section examines a number of factors that could be causing the differences in firm size and 
other characteristics across female- and male-owned firms. It first examines difference in 
external financing and then considers other obstacles to firm operation and growth. 
 
4.a. Differences in External Financing 
A possible reason why female-owned firms are smaller in terms of employees, property, 
machinery, and sales than male-owned firms could be that female-owned firms have less access 14 
 
to external finance, thus restricting their investment and growth. Table 4a displays the averages 
for several measures of access to external finance among female-owned firms
9. These averages 
indicate that the majority of female-owned firms in the Bolivian and Peruvian data rely on 
internal funds for financing working capital (78 percent). In the Enterprise Surveys, which cover 
larger firms, this number is lower, 46.9 percent. Female-owned firms in the Enterprise Surveys 
are much more likely to rely on bank funds for financing working capital than female-owned 
firms in the Bolivian and Peruvian data. The Enterprise Surveys also include information on the 
source for funds for financing investment. 56 percent of these funds are internal, and 20.4 
percent come from banks. The fraction of female-owned firms that have a loan from a financial 
institution varies greatly across datasets, ranging from a low 8 percent in the Mexican data, to 
52.4 percent in the Peruvian data.  
 
Table 4a: Access to External Finance – Averages for Female-Owned Firms 
  
Mexico Bolivia Peru  Enterprise 
Surveys   
% of working capital financed with internal funds    78.9  77.9  46.9 
% of working capital financed by banks    3.2  7.8  23.3 
% of investment financed with internal funds        56.0 
% of investment financed by banks        20.4 
Participates in a ROSCA    28.1     
Has a loan from a financial institution 8.09#  24.0  52.4  46.7 
Note:  
#In the Mexican data, this measure refers to ever having had a loan since starting the business, rather than 
currently having a loan.  
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN), 2002, Bolivian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 
2007, Peruvian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 2008, World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Brazil, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 2003. 
 
Table 4b shows the corresponding statistical difference in the measures of access to external 
finance across female-owned and male-owned firms. For ease of comparison with Table 4a, 
these differences do not control for region or industry effects. However, the results do not change 
significantly when including region and industry fixed effects. The differences in Table 4b do 
not support the hypothesis that female-owned firm have less access to finance than male-owned 
firms. There are no statistically significant differences in the use of bank finance for working 
capital or investment. In the Mexican and Peruvian data, there is also no statistically significant 
difference in the percentage of female-owned and male-owned firms that have a loan from a 
financial institution. In the Enterprise data, female-owned firm are 5.2 percent more likely to 
hold a bank loan than male-owned firms. In the Bolivian data, female-owned firms are 
significantly less likely to have a loan from a financial intuition. However, female firm owners 
are more likely to participate in a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), an 
informal savings and borrowing arrangement among individuals. Female-owned firms in the 
Bolivian data may thus be substituting informal financing for formal financing. The survey does 
not include the necessary information to gauge whether this is due to the fact that they do not 
have access to formal financing. A recent World Bank report complemented the Bolivian survey 
                                                            
9 Appendix Table A2 disaggregates the statistics for the Enterprise Surveys by country, so that it displays all 
statistics separately for Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The statistics in 
Appendix Table A2 illustrate that the findings from Table 4b and Table 5 are not driven by outliers. 15 
 
data with qualitative data from focus groups (World Bank, 2008). These focus groups revealed 
that many female business owners tend to mistrust credit institutions and fear the consequences 
of taking on debt, suggesting that the low use of finance among female-owned firms in Bolivia is 
due to demand-side constraints. 
 
Table 4b: Access to External Finance 
Differences in External Finance of Female- and Male-Owned Firms 
  
Mexico Bolivia  Peru  Enterprise 
Surveys   
% of working capital financed with internal funds    6.2  -4.2  -0.8 
% of working capital financed by banks    1.0  0.9  -0.7 
% of investment financed with internal funds        -1.4 
% of investment financed by banks        1.9 
Participates in a ROSCA    16.3***     
Has a loan from a financial institution -0.88  -12.8***  2.9  5.2* 
Note:  
#In the Mexican data, this measure refers to ever having had a loan since starting the business, rather than 
currently having a loan. Significance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN), 2002, Bolivian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 
2007, Peruvian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 2008, World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Brazil, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 2003. 
 
The Mexican data and the Enterprise Surveys include information on the reasons why firms do 
not have a loan from a financial institution. Table 5 shows that only a relatively small fraction of 
female-owned firms does not have a loan because their loan application was rejected. Moreover, 
in the Mexican data, female-owned firm are less likely than male-owned firms to have a loan 
application rejected. In the Enterprise Surveys, there is no difference in loan rejection rates 
across female- and male-owned firms. Table 5 also illustrates that 91.4 percent of female-owned 
firms in the Mexican data and 48.8 percent of female-owned firms in the Enterprise Survey data 
do not have a loan because they did not apply for a loan. For the Mexican data, this number is 
1.4 percent higher than for male-owned firms, but the size of the difference is small relative to 
the average of 91.4 percent. Among firms that did not apply for a loan, there is some evidence 
that a number of female-owned firms may be credit constrained. Female-owned firms in the 
Enterprise Surveys are 10.8 percent more likely to not have applied for a loan due to 
cumbersome application procedures. However, this result is reversed in the Mexican data, where 
women are 1.4 percent less likely to not apply for a loan due to cumbersome application 
procedures. 
 
Overall, the data do not provide systematic evidence for the hypothesis that female-owned firms 
have less access to external finance than male-owned firms. This leads me to examine other 
possible reasons for why female-owned firms in Latin America tend to be smaller than male-
owned firms.   16 
 
Table 5: Reasons for Not Having a Loan 
   Avg. for Female-Owned Firms     Difference (Female - Male) 
 
Mexico




#  Enterprise 
Surveys     
Loan application was rejected  0.5  5.5    -0.5*** -0.3 
Did not apply for loan  91.4  48.8    1.4** -4.7 
          
Reasons for not applying for a loan          
No need  69.7  38.5    2.4**  -6.9 
Cumbersome application procedures  8.8  18.9    -1.4*  10.7*** 
Stringent collateral requirements    12.2      2.2 
Interest rates are too high  14.4  25.7    -0.6  -6.6* 
Corruption in the allocation of bank credit    1.4      0.5 
Did not expect to be approved  2.6  2.7    -0.7*  -0.3 
Amount and/or maturity not convenient  1.6      -0.3   
Other 2.8  0.0     0.6 0.0 
Note:  
#In the Mexican data, all measure refers to ever having applied for a loan since starting the business. 
Significance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN), 2002, Bolivian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 
2007, Peruvian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 2008, World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Brazil, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 2003. 
 
4.b. Other Obstacles to Firm Operation and Growth 
This section relies on a series of perception-based questions to investigate whether female and 
male-owned firms face different types of obstacles to firm operation and growth. The Bolivian, 
Peruvian, and Enterprise Survey data ask the respondents to gauge whether a series of different 
factors represent an obstacle to the firm’s operation and growth. Table 6 displays the percentage 
of female-owned firms that perceive each factor as an obstacle, along with the corresponding 
difference to male-owned firms
10. For ease of comparison with the average percentages, the 
differences do not control for region or industry effects. However, the results do not change 
significantly when including region and industry fixed effects. 
 
Many of the variables listed in Table 6 are equally perceived as obstacles by female-owned and 
male-owned firms. Moreover, for most variables where there is a statistically significant 
difference, female-owned firms are actually less likely to perceive the variable as an obstacle 
than male-owned firms. For example, in the Bolivian data, female-owned firms are 10.9 percent 
less likely to perceive access to finance as an obstacle than male-owned firms.  
 
There are only three variables that a greater percentage of female-owned firms perceive to be an 
obstacle than male-owned firms. The first is that, in the Enterprise Surveys, female-owned firms 
are 3.9 percent more likely to see macroeconomic instability as an obstacle than male-owned 
firms. However, a total of about 90 percent of firms report macroeconomic instability to be an 
obstacle, implying that the economic relevance of the 3.9 percent difference is quite small. The 
                                                            
10 Appendix Table A3 displays the results separately for the different countries covered in the Enterprise Surveys. 17 
 
data in Appendix Table A3, which displays the obstacles separately for all the countries covered 
in the Enterprise Surveys, shows that the difference in the perception of macroeconomic 
instability as an obstacle is driven by the observations from Ecuador and El Salvador. In these 
two countries, female-owned firms are about 20 percent more likely than male-owned firms to 
report that macroeconomic instability is an obstacle. These differences persist even after 
controlling for industry fixed effects. 
 
The other two variables that a higher percentage of female-owned firms perceive to be an 
obstacle than male-owned firms are both related to child care and household obligations. 
Unfortunately, information on these obstacles is only available for the Bolivian data. 59.5 
percent of female-owned firms in the Bolivian data report that having to care for small children 
or family is an obstacle to their firm’s operation and growth. Similarly, 71.1 percent of female-
owned firms in the Bolivian data perceive family obligations or household chores as an obstacle. 
Both numbers are about 23 percentage points higher than for male-owned firms. In absolute and 
in relative terms, these are by far the greatest differences in perceived obstacles across female- 
and male-owned firms. 
 
Table 6: Obstacles to Firm Operation and Growth 
   % that perceive … as an obstacle 
 
Average for Female-Owned 
Firms     Difference (Female - Male) 
 
Bolivia Peru Enterprise 
Surveys 
 
Bolivia Peru  Enterprise 
Surveys     
Access to land  59.5    45.1    -6.5    3.9 
Labor regulation  31.4  61.9  65.2    -2.6  4.4  -2.5 
Skills and education of available workers 55.4 62.5  77.4  -3.0 -9.0** 2.1 
Business licensing and operating permits      53.3      -2.7  -3.6 
Access to finance (e.g. collateral)  71.1  75.6  76.2    -10.9**  -2.7  1.0 
Cost of finance (e.g. interest rates)  68.6  79.8  82.8    -19.6***  -6.0*  -0.7 
Economic and regulatory policy 
uncertainty 83.5  91.1  88.4    -6.1  -0.5  -1.2 
Macroeconomic instability  89.3  94.6 92.2    -1.7  -0.8  4.1** 
Corruption 80.2  92.3  88.1    -9.4**  1.0  3.1 
Crime, theft and disorder  91.7  93.5  81.5    4.9  -2.7  1.1 
Anti-competitive or informal practices     84.3       3.2 
Legal system/conflict resolution  32.2  54.2  65.2    -7.4  0.8  -2.0 
Having to care for small children or family 59.5       23.4***    
Family obligations or household chores  71.1           21.8***       
Note:  Significance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN), 2002, Bolivian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 
2007, Peruvian World Bank Micro Enterprises Survey, 2008, World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Brazil, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 2003. 
 
The data on perceived obstacles to firm operation and growth in this section does not suggest that 
female-owned firms face more severe obstacles than male-owned firms in most areas. The only 18 
 
factors that many more female-owned firms report to be obstacles than male-owned firms are 
having to care for small children and having to fulfill other family obligations and household 
chores. These could thus be important reasons for why female-owned firms tend to be smaller 
and less profitable than male-owned firms. The following section investigates whether there is 
indeed a relationship between child care obligations and characteristics and performance of 
female-owned firms.  
4.c. Child Care Responsibilities and Household Chores 
This section uses the 2002 Mexican ENAMIN data to examine whether child care obligations are 
correlated with smaller size and lower performance of female-owned firms. The sample of micro 
firm owners surveyed in the ENAMIN is drawn from a larger sample of individuals surveyed in 
the Mexican labor market survey (ENE). The ENE includes information on all household 
members. By linking the ENAMIN to the ENE, I can thus calculate whether a firm owner lives 
in a household where children are present. The data show that 56 percent of firm owners live in a 
household that has at least one child under the age of 12. 
Table 7 displays the results of regressing different firm characteristics on a dummy variable for 
female firm ownership, a dummy variable for having children under the age of 12 in the 
household, and the interaction of the two. The regressions also control for age, education, and 
marital status, as well as region dummies to avoid any bias in the results due to these factors. The 
coefficient on the female dummy represents the difference in the outcome variables across 
female-owned and male-owned firms in households where there are no children under the age of 
12 present. The sum of the coefficient on the female dummy and on the interaction term 
represents the difference in outcome variables across female-owned and male-owned firms in 
households with children under the age of 12. 
The results for employees as the outcome variable show that female-owned firms have 5.3 
percent fewer employees than male-owned firms in households where there are no children 
under the age of 12. In households, where there are children under the age of 12, this difference 
increases to 8.7 percent. Similarly, the difference in machinery value across female- and male-
owned firms is also greater in households with children under the age of 12. For sales, the pattern 
is again similar, although the difference between female- and male-owned firms in households 
with children under the age of 12 is not statistically significant. With respect to profits, I examine 
the difference in average and in median profits. The difference in average profits does not vary 
with the presence of children under 12. However, the difference in median profits across female- 
and male-owned firms is 2.5 percentage points higher in households with children under 12 (up 
from 4.4 percent). 
The evidence in Table 7 suggests that the difference in size and performance of female- and 
male-owned firms is 30 to 40 percent larger when children under 12 are present in the household. 
A possible interpretation of this finding is that women need to care for these children at the same 19 
 
time as they are running their business, putting a strain on the time and resources they can devote 
to the business. This interpretation is in line with the finding from Section 4.b that female-owned 
firms are more likely to perceive child care responsibilities as an obstacle to firm operation and 
growth than male-owned firms. However, the results in this section are correlations and are thus 
not necessarily causal. More research is needed to determine whether child care responsibilities 
lead women to own smaller and less profitable firms. Finally, note that the differences in size and 
performance across female- and male-owned firms are still present in households where there are 
no children under the age of 12, although the differences are smaller in magnitude. 
Table 7: Child Care Responsibilities and Differences in Firm Characteristics  











Ln employees  -0.053***  0.005  -0.034* 
  (0.014) (0.012)  (0.018) 
Ln machinery value  -0.884***  0.018  -0.342*** 
  (0.075) (0.055)  (0.099) 
Ln sales (last month)  -0.164***  -0.011  -0.056 
  (0.048) (0.036)  (0.064) 
Profits (last month, in thousands)  -0.055***  0.009  -0.002 
  (0.014) (0.012)  (0.019) 
Profits (last month, in thousands)  -0.044***  0.006  -0.025*** 
 - median regression  (0.010) (0.008)  (0.014) 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN), 2002, and Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE), 2002-I. 
 
In addition to child care responsibilities, other household obligations could also prevent female 
business owners from devoting more attention and resources to their business, limiting the firm’s 
growth. A recent World Bank report finds that female-owned firms in Bolivia are twice as likely 
to operate inside the owner’s home as male-owned firms (World Bank, 2008). This finding is 
based on the same Bolivian data as is used in this paper. Table 8 shows the corresponding 
percentages of female- and male-owned firms that operate inside the home. The number is only 
10 percent for male-owned firms, but it is 23.2 percent for female-owned firms. 
Table 8: Percentage of Firms Operating Inside the Owner’s House 
   Female-Owned Firms  Male-Owned Firms  Difference (Female - Male) 
Bolivia 23.2  10.1  13.1*** 
Mexico 30.3  11.1  18.8*** 
Note:  *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 




The Mexican ENAMIN data also includes information on whether the business is located in the 
owner’s home or not. As shown in Table 8, the difference in the percentage of firms operating 
inside the owner’s home is even greater in the Mexican data than in the Bolivian data. In the 
Mexican data, 11.1 percent of male-owned firms operate inside the home, while 30.3 percent of 
female-owned firms operate inside the home. The difference in the Mexican data remains 
unchanged even after controlling for whether children under the age of 12 are present in the 
household. This suggests that household chores other than caring for children influence the 
location of female-owned businesses. This result is in line with Cunningham and Gomez (2004) 
who show that their finding that female home-based workers (most of whom are self-employed) 
have lower earnings and work fewer hours than male home-based workers is largely related to 
marital status, not to the presence of children. It thus appears that household obligations 
constrain women to set up businesses that can be operated from within the home. This restricts 
their choice of industry and potentially also the decision to formalize the firm, which can in turn 
have consequences for the performance of the business. 
4.d. Differences in Risk Aversion  
Another reason why female-owned firms are smaller on average than male-owned firms could be 
that female firm owners may be more risk averse than male firms owners. This could lead female 
firm owners to forgo profitable investments and to be reluctant to expand their business. 
Evidence based on US data suggests that women are less likely to take financial risks than men 
(Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998, and Sunden and Surette, 1998), although this has been called 
into question by Schubert et al (1999). However, these studies are not limited to entrepreneurs 
and since owning a business is per se a risky undertaking, the women who select into business 
ownership may not be more risk averse than men.  
Unfortunately, none of the surveys used in the other sections of this paper measure the level of 
risk aversion of the firm owner. I will thus rely on an Innovations for Poverty Action survey of 
micro, small, and medium size businesses in Puebla, Mexico, to investigate differences in risk 
aversion. In this survey, the firm’s principal decision maker was asked to rate their willingness to 
take risks on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the highest willingness to take risks. 28 percent 
of principal decision makers in the data are women. Table 9 displays the average willingness to 
take general risks, health risks, as well as financial risks. Women score slightly higher on all 
variables than men, although the differences are small and not statistically significant. There is 
thus no evidence that women are more risk averse than men. 
Table 9: Willingness to Take Risks 
   Women  Men  Difference (Women - Men) 
General risk taking  8.04  7.87  0.17 
Health risk taking  6.00  5.61  0.39 
Financial risk taking  6.23  6.01  0.22 




This paper examines female entrepreneurship in Latin America. It first shows that up to 50% of 
microenterprise owners in Latin America are women. However, the share of female owners 
declines with firm size and is a low as 12 percent for firms with more than 11 employees. The 
paper then asks how the characteristics and performance of female-owned firms in Latin 
America compare to those of male-owned firms. Firm-level surveys from a number of countries 
show that female-owned firms are smaller than male-owned firms in terms of employees, 
physical capital, sales, and costs. They also have lower profits than male-owned firms.  
The productivity analysis in this paper reveals that, among micro and small-sized firms, female-
owned firms are less productive than male-owned firms. However, there is no difference in 
productivity across medium and large sized female- and male-owned firms. 
The paper considers several possible factors that could be the reason why female-owned firms 
tend to be smaller than male-owned firms. There is no consistent evidence that female-owned 
firms have less access to finance than male-owned firms. Moreover, female firm owners are not 
more likely to perceive a host of other factors related to regulation and market conditions as an 
obstacle to firm operation and growth than male firm owners. The only large difference is that 
female firm owners are much more likely to view child care and household obligations as 
obstacles to firm operation and growth. 
Combined household and micro firm data from Mexico also points to child care obligations 
restricting the growth of female-owned firms. This data shows that the differences in size and 
profits between female- and male-owned firms are larger for women who live in households 
where children under the age of 12 are present. The presence of children accounts for about 30 to 
40 percent of the size and profit difference between female- and male-owned firms. Additional 
results from Mexico and Bolivia also show that female-owned firms are two to three times more 
likely to operate inside the owner’s home than male-owned firms. This suggests that household 
obligations could restrict location, size, and industry choices for female-firm owners, possibly 
leading to performance differences. 
The findings of this paper suggest that policy should focus on promoting the growth of existing 
female-owned firms rather than encouraging the creation of more female-owned firms. The 
percentage of female firm owners among micro firms is already high in most countries, but it 
appears to be more difficult for women to grow their firms into small and medium-sized 
businesses. The obstacles to the growth of female-owned firms that need to be addressed now 
seem to have less to do with access to finance or regulation, but rather with child care and family 
obligations. However, more research is needed to investigate whether providing child care 
facilities can foster the growth of female-owned firms in Latin America. 22 
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Table A1: Percentage of Female-Owned Firms by Industry 
 
A1a: Mexico Data 




Communication and transportation  1.9 
Construction 0.1 
 




Camelid wool products  83.3 
Selling groceries  75.8 
Selling prepared food  73.9 
Clothing manufacture  65.3 
Handicrafts and furniture  5.9 
Transportation 2.6 
 
A1c: Peru Data 
Industry %  female 
Selling food  51.5 
Restaurants and hotels  45.2 
Textile and clothing manufacture  38.6 
Transportation 25.0 
Metal products manufacture  15.7 
Wood products and furniture manufacture  15.6 
Shoe and leather manufacture  15.2 
 
A1d: Enterprise Survey Data 
Industry %  female 
Clothing 32.2 
Minerals and oil (incl. glass, ceramics and brick)  16.8 
Food 15.3 
Chemicals and plastic  12.9 
Leather 11.4 
Wood products  10.2 




Table A2: Access to External Finance and Reasons for not having a Loan by Country 
   Average for Female-Owned Firms 
 Brazil  Ecuador  El  Salvador  Guatemala Honduras  Nicaragua 
% of working capital financed with internal funds  43.7  21.7  42.4  64.1  39.5  54.4 
% of working capital financed by banks  27.0  33.4  20.5  15.5  22.7  14.5 
% of investment financed with internal funds  59.4  45.0  35.5  55.7  50.0  61.2 
% of investment financed by banks  13.8  55.0  32.9  28.3  21.4  23.0 
Has a loan  39.5  44.4  71.1  44.1  58.3  50.8 
            
Did not apply for loan  53.1    27.8  56.8  42.8  46.8 
Loan application was rejected  8.4    2.6  0.0  0.0  3.4 
            
Reasons for not applying for a loan             
No  need  42.5   50.0  36.8 20.0 25.9 
Cumbersome  application  procedures  14.9   20.0  26.3 20.0 25.9 
Stringent collateral requirements  13.8    10.0  0.0  0.0  18.5 
Interest rates are too high  25.3    0.0  31.6  60.0  25.9 
Corruption in the allocation of bank credit  0.0    10.0  5.3  0.0  0.0 
Did not expect to be approved  2.3     10.0  0.0  0.0  3.7 
  Difference (Female - Male) 
 Brazil  Ecuador  El  Salvador  Guatemala Honduras  Nicaragua 
% of working capital financed with internal funds  -0.8  -19.0  3.0  3.0  -6.1  -1.4 
% of working capital financed by banks  -0.8  5.2  -9.4*  3.9  -3.2  2.8 
% of investment financed with internal funds  0.7  6.1  -10.2  -5.6  -3.5  -3.9 
% of investment financed by banks  0.6  14.6  -0.2  10.0  -5.6  3.4 
Has a loan  6.4  6.1  1.9  -1.9  4.4  2.8 
            
Did not apply for loan  -7.6*  6.1  -0.9  6.0  -0.5  -0.9 
Loan application was rejected  1.4    -1.0  -4.2***  -3.9**  -1.9 
            
Reasons for not applying for a loan             
No need  -2.0    -12.2  -20.9*  -14.7  -10.2 
Cumbersome application procedures  7.0*    14.6  20.2*  8.0  15.6* 
Stringent collateral requirements  6.7*    -0.8  -10.8***  -14.7***  -4.2 
Interest rates are too high  -11.4**    -5.4  9.3  25.3  -0.9 
Corruption in the allocation of bank credit  -0.8**    10.0  5.3  .  -3.1* 
Did not expect to be approved  -0.1     -6.2  -3.1**  -4*  2.7 
Note: Significance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 




Table A3: Obstacles to Operation and Growth by Country 
   Average for Female-Owned Firms 
  Brazil Ecuador El  Salvador  Guatemala Honduras  Nicaragua 
Access to land  53.9 11.1  42.1  41.2  41.7  30.5 
Labor regulation  88.0 33.3  28.9  61.8  58.3  32.2 
Skills and education of available workers  91.6 44.4  73.7  73.5  50.0  52.5 
Business licensing and operating permits  73.7 33.3  23.7  44.1  50.0  23.7 
Access to finance (e.g. collateral)  87.4 44.4  47.4  67.6  66.7  74.6 
Cost of finance (e.g. interest rates)  94.0 66.7  50.0  73.5  83.3  79.7 
Economic and regulatory policy uncertainty  97.0 88.9  63.2  88.2  75.0  83.1 
Macroeconomic instability (inflation, exchg. rate)  97.6 88.9  78.9  88.2  91.7  88.1 
Corruption  91.6 55.6  73.7  100.0  91.7  84.7 
Crime, theft and disorder  85.0 33.3  81.6  94.1  83.3  71.2 
Anti-competitive or informal practices  94.0 44.4  71.1  79.4  75.0  76.3 
Legal system/conflict resolution  76.0 44.4  39.5  61.8  66.7  55.9 
  Difference (Female - Male) 
  Brazil Ecuador El  Salvador  Guatemala Honduras  Nicaragua 
Access to land  6.3 1.8  18.6*  -2.9  6.8  -7.5 
Labor regulation  -0.9 11.2  -6.3  4.3  1.6  2.9 
Skills and education of available workers  4.1* 10.7  8.2  -0.8  -19.1  4.9 
Business licensing and operating permits  0.9 15.9  -12.3  -2.2  -1.1  -5.6 
Access to finance (e.g. collateral)  2.5 -12.5  -4.1  9.4  8.6  1.0 
Cost of finance (e.g. interest rates)  0.5 -3.1  -8.8  8.4  0.2  -1.1 
Economic and regulatory policy uncertainty  0.1 9.8  -3.8  1.3  -6.5 -1.6 
Macroeconomic instability (inflation, exchg. rate)  0.5 23.8**  20.1**  1.6  10.8  5.9 
Corruption  2.8 4.4  6.0  7.3*** 8.5  1.1 
Crime, theft and disorder  1.8 -0.4  0.0  1.8  2.4  1.0 
Anti-competitive or informal practices  4.9** -9.0  -3.2  2.0  8.7  -0.2 
Legal system/conflict resolution  -2.1 1.4  -12.0  3.5  8.8  0.6 
Note: Significance levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys, 2003. 
 